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The Report of the Review Committee on Overseas
Representation, 1968-1969 (chaired by Sir Val Duncan),
presented to the British Parliament in July 1969, is
striking both for its businesslike quality and its
business orientation. After acknowledging the primacy
of security considerations in British external policy,
the Duncan Committee goes on to state bluntly that the
balance of responsibilities of overseas representation
"should now reflect the clear precedence that belongs
to the commercial objective in the day-to--day conduct
of Britain's relations with other countries." The
dominant thrust of the Duncan Report is its reconcil-
iation of political and commercial objectives through
proposals to effect a harmonisation of the two at the
least financial cost within the framework of a realis-
tic re-appraisal of Britain's changing international
role.
The spirit of realism permeating the Report is
dramatically conveyed in the proposals for disting-
uishing primary and secondary spheres of British
diplomatic and commercial activities. To this end,
British interests are initially classified into two
broad spheres: an "Area of Concentration" and the
remaining "Outer Area". The former is composed of
Western European and North American countries whose
"social structures, ways of living, methods of
conducting political and economic business are suffic-
iently similar" and whose "domestic affairs are increas-
ingly interrelated" so as to permit a closer degree
of political and economic co-operation and integration.
As for the "Outer Area", the Committee in fact does
not consider it as a broad residual category as it
might appear to be at first sight. For there are
some inner zones in the "Outer Area" which, to all
intents and purposes, in terms of British interests lie
closer to the "Area of Concentration" than to the
outer zones of the "Outer Area". Thus the Committee
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suggests that for commercial or political (or for a
combination of both) reasons, there are certain "Outer
Area" high priority countries such as Australia, South
Africa, New Zealand and Japan (and to a lesser extent
at present, China and the Soviet bloc countries) in
which "Comprehensive" Missions, similar to those
recommended for the "Area of Concentration", might
profitably be maintained. By contrast, the greater
part of the Third World is to be found in the remoter
zones of the "Outer Area" which the Committee recommends
should be manned by "Selective" Hissions.
In the author's view, the significant distinctions
made by the Committee lie not in the broad categories
of "Area of Concentration" and "Outer Area", but in
"Area of Concentration" and inner "Outer Area" on the
one hand and outer "Outer Area" on the other. With few
exceptions, the latter distinctions coincide markedly
with the developed and the developing world as well as
the white and non-white world. In its own unintended
way, the Duncan Committee has in effect hinted at the
growing gap between developed and developing world
positions and interests, and the nagging correspondence
of race and power in the contemporary international
system.
While the Committee makes it quite clear that
Britain's interests in the Third World will by no means
disappear overnight, it also establishes that these
relations are in a process of major political and
economic transformation. With regard to the former,
the Committee suggests for example that "if all goes
well, the mature Commonwealth relationships of the
1970s should be marked by a depth of social affinity
between peoples combined with a significant diminution
in the depth of political contact between governments."
In the light of the earlier analysis, it is to be
assumed that the "significant diminution ... of
political contact" anticipated relates more to relations
between the old and new Commonwealth than to relations
within the former group. Similarly, the Committee
envisages significant transformations in the area of
trade relationships. Thus the Report notes that in the
outer zone of the "Outer Ara" there is "a large
number of Commonwealth countries where commercial
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sections of Posts have tended to concentrate on main-
taining Britain's traditional trade whereas there is
also an urgent necessity to develop new outlets." As
for Britain's reorientation of trade, the Committee
concludes: "We think that there is a high probability
that a considerably increased proportion of the world's
trade will take place in the Area of Concentration
and that an increasing nuiñber of policy decisions on
commercial and broader economic issues will be taken
in concert by these nations."
While the question of Britain's future aid
relationships with countries in the outer zone is not
exhaustively tackled, the Committee's treathent of
principles of British Aid Administration (Chaper 7)
allows us to raise some considerations on the broader
issue of the principle of foreign aid in relation to
Third World interests.
The Committee at the outset admits to the
importance of aid as a tool of statecraft in the
contemporary international system. In initially
considering the question from the standpoint of
Britain's "enlightened self-interest", the Committee
performs a useful, if limited, service in drawing
attention to the economic rewards of aid accruing to
the British economy from (a) helping to develop"more
lucrative trading partners"; (b) the tying of bilateral
aid to purchase of British goods; (c) the fact that
"when British aid is distributed through international
organisations ... British industry gets back more in
the form of the resulting orders, which are put out
to world-wide tender, than is contributed by the
British Government." Statistical documentation is,
however, lacking, and this is where a recent Labour
Party pamphlet, "The Fight Against World Poverty"
fulfils an essential complementary service. For example,
at least two-thirds of the British aid programme is
spent on British goods and services; and for every
Shs. 20 of multilateral aid by Britain there had been
resulting export orders of Shs. 30.
Nor does the Duncan Committee reveal data on
the relative proportions of grants and loans in
British aid, a consideration which would have helped
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to buttress its "enlightened self-interest" case.
(The Labour Party Pamphlet estimates that Britain
receives some £60m per year as repayment on capital
and interest on old aid loans.) The Committee's
categorisation of the British programme as "aid-giving"
is insufficient, failing as it does to draw attention
to the important element of "aid-loaning".
In 1965 Mrs Barbara Castle, then Minister of
Overseas Development, called for a massive "teach-
in" to educate Western public opinion on the realities
of foreign aid. Since there is no evidence to indicate
that British public opinion is any better informed
now than then, and considering the recent admission in
Parliament by Reg Prentice, Mrs Castle's successor,
that the balance of payments position would have been
worse had Britain not been involved in the foreign aid
business, it is a pity that the Duncan Committee
has discussed these issues so briefly. For it is
necessary to drive home the point that aid cannot be
considered merely as "give-aways"; nor would self-
respecting recipients of aid wish it to be an exercise
in charity. But there also is a pressing need for a
Third World "teach-in", for the author's impressions
are that Third World public opinion is very much
ignorant of the advantages which they actually derive
from aid, or of the inherent limitations of planning
their development on the principle of aid.
The latter question - - the principle of aid
itself rather than the principles which ideally should
influence aid relationships - - will occupy my atten-
tion in the remainder of the present discussion. The
most that will be attempted is a limited examination
of some drawbacks of aid and its unreliability as a
tool in Third World development planning in the light
of the reflections of the Duncan Committee.
The first consideration follows from the above
discussion of the financial flow-backs to the economies
of aid-giving and aid-loaning countries. The Duncan
Committee stresses the need for efficient involvement
by British overseas representatives "in the progress
of particular projects to ensure that the ground rules
are followed, for example as to the purchase of
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British equipment." While this is fair game, it also
illustrates some of the limitations of the bilateral
aid device from the point of view of Third World
interests in that such stipulations limit flexibility
of expenditures (even in the case of loans) and in some
cases might well involve higher financial burdens
because of restrictions imposed on shopping around for
equipment and services in the international market.
Indeed, such patterns may well in the long run exacerbate
the relationship of dependence of recipient on aid-
producing economies (primarily those of the former
colonial power in the case of the Afro-Asian and Caribbean
countries). A perhaps extreme but nevertheless real
example of this "hook-up" function of aid may be cited.
It was recently documented that out of $9,480m French
subsidies to 14 African countries between 1955 and
1964, $3,900m was paid to French firms for goods
exported to, and an additional $5,530m was paid into
the home bank accounts of French companies and
specialists working in these countries.1 Clearly,
there is an urgent Third World need to view more
discriminatingly the "benefits" of aid.
A second area of discussion involves the general
influences pertaining to the conclusion of bilateral
aid agreements. Two considerations are relevant:
(a) the economic principles underlying aid project
evaluation and (b) the political and diplomatic context
in which decisions are arrived at. In these respects,
the Duncan Committee considers it essential to
"integrate aid administration to the utmost with the
rest of the work" of British overseas missions "in order
that the overall objectives of the Government may be
adequately served, that is our commercial and political
interests as well as our interest in raising the
standard of living of the recipient country." The
latter "interest" need not detain us since the general
tenor of the Duncan Report establishes firmly the
primacy of commercial and political interests. En
other words, the "interest in raising the standard of
living of the recipient country", while conceived of in
,,
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ternis of an overall harmonisation of British policy
interests, is clearly a subordinate one.
Onc. need not quarrel with the basic "commercial
and political interests" premises of the Report.
This is as it should be, within the framework of any
bilateral aid system which necessarily and properly
involves attempts by the parties involved to maximise
their benefits. But a closer inspection of the
advantages actually accruing to the recipient
economies should as a matter of realism and necessity
involve serious consideration of the alternative of
recasting Third World thought outside the framework
of the aid system.
For one thing, there are inherent problems
arising within a context of bargaining between
unequals. "Political relations between governments
are significant when one or other party is in a
position to exert political influence", the Duncan
Committee declares, and this too applies in the
realm of economic relations. But in the latter area,
relations between the developed and developing world
are even more one-sided as a result of which aid
agreements are often concluded more in deference to
the interests of the aid-producing than the recipient
economy. As Nik Cavell, former head of Canada's
Colombo Plan programme, put it in 1963:
Each donor country still has its own independent
program, each country gives what it chooses to
give. If it has too much wheat, it dumps as
much of the surplus as possible into its aid
program. If it has slackness in some parts
of its economy, it tries to pull it up by
filling its factories with orders paid for
by its own aid dollars, regardless of whether
the product it is donating makes a real
contribution to the development of the country
that gets it. In foreign aid, half a loaf
can sometimes be as bad as no bread.
What, then are the implications of the Duncan
Report with regrd to the issue of aid negotiation
and influencp' The Committee s.ates that "dd will
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form the main burden of our dealings with a number of
countries in the future." These countries are in
fact located in the outer zone of the "Outer Area"
in which a reduced scale of British diplomatic
activity and general economic contact is envisaged.
In short, in the areas least relevant to overall
British interests aid relations will become more
specialised and will constitute the primary (in some
specific instances, perhaps the exclusive) means of
economic contact. In such conditions aid, being
increasingly divorced from broader mutual political
interests on the one hand, and being more subordinated
to British commercial objectives on the other, is
likely to exacerbate the problems of imbalance of
influence and increase the likelihood of the triumph
of unilateralism in bilateral negotiations.
Moreover, the Committee's anticipation that
Commonwealth aid will be channelled "on a more
selective basis" in the future appears to presage
an even greater degree of subjection of aid-intensive
development planning in recipient countries to British
commercial interests and economic objectives. The
alliance between British aid and British capitalism
which one might expect to achieve a greater degree of
maturity in such circumstances could place limitations
on political flexibility, and act as a powerful derad-
icalising force, in recipient economies - - that is
if these economies consider it feasible to rely on
bilateral aid as an important meáns of development.
This leads us into a third consideration, the
uncertainty of sources and volume of aid. Statements
of intention by developed countries to increase their
flow of aid have consistently outpaced performance.
If current United States approaches are at all
representative, the problem of "uncertainty" is likely
to become more serious in the future. The 1969
United States aid budget was the lowest in twenty
years, so much so that a panel of American businessmen
and educators very recently concluded that "the aid
progrmm has been reduced to the point where it is now
utterly inadequate to the tasks and opportunities
that present themselves in low-income countries."
This issue was highlighted in the September 1969
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meeting of the Trade and Development Board of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - -
generally considered to be one of the most unproductive
meetings in the history of UNcTAD - - in which the
differing, and at times irreconcilable, interests -of
the developing and developed countries were underlined
in many acrimonious debates on strategies for develop-
ment in the 1970s. On the aid question, developed
countries were severely criticised for failing to
make firm conjuitments on target dates for aid.
Concerning Britain's posture, the Duncan Committee
on the basis of statements of Government policy asstines
"that the total volume of aid from public funds will
not be sharply increased in the next few years." But
considering the Committee's forecast of more select-
ivity in aid, one cannot rule out the possibilities
of drastic reductions, if not overall at 1ast in
specific instances. As far as the Committee is
concerned, recipient economies cannot expect more
beneficial aid-treatment from Britain in the near
future and, if anything, they would be well advised
to prepare themselves for aid terms less favourable
than at present. Thus is underscored one of the major
drawbacks of reliance on aid for development, nnely
the uncertainties of, and lack of controls over,
revenue inflows.
At this stage, it would be in order to raise a
fourth and final matter which is assiing increasingly
serious proportions. This concerns the repayments of
loans and interest charges, an issue which, though
outsid, the scope of the Duncan Report, should be
considered in any discussion of the feasibility of
the aid principle. David Horowitz, governor of the
Bank of Israel and an acknowledged expert on foreign
aid, recently warned that during the 1970s the repayment
of debt and interest will equal the total amount of
aid received annually by developing countries. This
would represent an extension of a trend already
documented. In 1966, for example, the debt service
repayment of 34 developing countries comprised more
than half of the loans received and in 12 such cases
repayments exceeded net inflows. The short-run gains
f rain foreign aid may thus result in severe long-rim
imanticip*ted disadvautages
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The foregoing discussion has deliberately concen-
trated on some dysfunctional aspects of aid hopefully
in order to counterbalance the dominant pro-aid theme
in writings on the subject. We have not dealt with the
pros and cons of multilateral aid, not only because
bilateral aid is the major emphasis in the Duncan
Report but also because it represents the primary
framework of contemporary aid programmes. Nor has it
been possible to analyse the nature of technical aid
progras, bu these in any case, while important,
represent far less financial transactions than those
involved in grants and loans. (Between 1966 and 1968,
British technical aid programmes accounted for roughly
one-sixth to one-fifth of total aid disbursements.)
Moreover, the scope and quality of technical aid is
frequently dependent on other financial aid consider-
ations.
At the present time, bilateral financial aid
continues to play an important role in Third World
development planning. While a sudden closure of aid
sources cannot be anticipated, it would be appropriate
for the Third World to view the entire principle of
aid more discriminatingly even to the extent of
attempting to phase out aid as a means of development.
The time seems ripe for a critical Third World
reassessment not least because some developed
countries are inclined to promote their own critical
reassessments, the results of which might increasingly
prove less amenable to the formeTr's interests.
To be sure, there has been increasing Third World
awareness of the limitations of the aid principle.
Hence its coordination of strategies in the drive to
enhance its position in the international trade
system. But few such countries have begun to ask the
critical question: "Why Aid?". In this connection,
Third World countries might well aempt to Duncanise
their concerns, that is by promoting a critical and
hardheaded analysis of the aid principle in relation
to their evolving political and economic interests, in
the spirit of nationalist realism and national self-
interest that characterises the Duncan Report.
Such analysis could involve the following consider-
ations: the optimisation of development costs through
aid compared with other means; the short-run gains
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and long-run costs of aid; the deradicalising potential
of aid; the balance struck between expectations and
achievements of development through aid; the problems
of accessibility to aid sources. In short, what seems
to be urgently required is a comprehensive Third
World reassessment of the functional and dysfunctional
aspects of aid, generally in the context of overall
political, socio-economic and psychological factors
in development, and specifically with a view to
enhancing the extractive capabilities of developing
economies through a greater reliance on indigenous
resources.
"Economics is often the very stuff of politics",
the Duncan Committee maintains. This timely reminder
might be rephrased to suggest that politics is often
the essential inspiration to economic conduct. It
would therefore seem appropriate to advocate the
need for a Third World movement beyond bureaucratic
tradition (in which the principle-of aid is still
entrenched) to political imagination (which ought
to involve a judicious reconsideration of the concept
of aid).
Postscript. Shortly after this article was completed
(in late September 1969). the World Bank's Annual
Report criticised developed countries for failing to
live up to their aid commitments. And a Newsweek
survey of white American public opinion (published
in the 6 October 1969 issue) has revealed that 57%
think that the Government should spend less money on
foreign economic aid while only 6% think that there
should be an increase. Trends such as these lend
further support to my arguments above.
